UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. OAKLAND CANNABIS BUYERS' COOPERATIVE AND JEFFREY JONES
No. 00-151
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
532 U.S. 483; 121 S. Ct. 1711; 149 L. Ed. 2d 722 (2001)
March 28, 2001, Argued
May 14, 2001, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
190 F.3d 1109, reversed and remanded.
SYLLABUS
Respondent Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative was organized to distribute marijuana
to qualified patients for medical purposes. The United States sued to enjoin the
Cooperative and its executive director, also a respondent (together, the Cooperative),
under the Controlled Substances Act. The United States argued that the Cooperative's
activities violated the Act's prohibitions on distributing, manufacturing, and possessing
with the intent to distribute or manufacture a controlled substance. The District
Court enjoined the Cooperative's activities, but the Cooperative continued to distribute
marijuana. The District Court found the Cooperative in contempt, rejecting its defense
that any distributions were medically necessary. The court later rejected the Cooperative's
motion to modify the injunction to permit medically necessary distributions. The
Cooperative appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the ruling on
the motion to modify the injunction. According to the Ninth Circuit, medical necessity
is a legally cognizable defense likely applicable in the circumstances, the District
Court mistakenly believed it had no discretion to issue an injunction more limited
in scope than the Controlled Substances Act, and the District Court should have
weighed the public interest and considered factors such as the serious harm in depriving
patients of marijuana in deciding whether to modify the injunction.
Held:
1. There is no medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions
on manufacturing and distributing marijuana. Pp. 5-11.
(a) Because that Act classifies marijuana as a schedule I controlled substance,
it provides only one express exception to the prohibitions on manufacturing and
distributing the drug: Government-approved research projects. The Cooperative's
contention that a common-law medical necessity defense should be written into the
Act is rejected. There is an open question whether federal courts ever have authority
to recognize a necessity defense not provided by statute. But that question need
not be answered to resolve the issue presented here, for the terms of the Controlled
Substances Act leave no doubt that the medical necessity defense is unavailable.
Pp. 5-7.
(b) Under any conception of legal necessity, the defense cannot succeed when the
legislature itself has made a determination of values. Here, the Act reflects a
determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception (other
than Government-approved research). Whereas other drugs can be dispensed and prescribed
for medical use, see 21 U.S.C. § 829, the same is not true for marijuana, which
has "no currently accepted medial use" at all, § 811. This conclusion
is supported by the structure of the Act, which divides drugs into five schedules,
depending in part on whether a drug has a currently accepted medical use, and then
imposes restrictions according to the schedule in which it has been placed. The
Attorney General is authorized to include a drug in schedule I, the most restrictive
schedule, only if the drug has no currently accepted medical use. The Cooperative
errs in arguing that, because Congress, instead of the Attorney General, placed
marijuana into that schedule, marijuana can be distributed when medically necessary.
The statute treats all schedule I drugs alike, and there is no reason why drugs
that Congress placed there should be subject to fewer controls than those that the
Attorney General placed there. Also rejected is the Cooperative's argument that
a drug may be found medically necessary for a particular patient or class even when
it has not achieved general acceptance as a medical treatment. It is clear from
the text of the Act that Congress determined that marijuana has no medical benefits
worthy of an exception granted to other drugs. The statute expressly contemplates
that many drugs have a useful medical purpose, see § 801(1), but it includes no
exception at all for any medical use of marijuana. This Court is unwilling to view
that omission as an accident and is unable, in any event, to override a legislative
determination manifest in the statute. Finally, the canon of constitutional avoidance
has no application here, because there is no statutory ambiguity. Pp. 7-11.
2. The discretion that courts of equity traditionally possess in fashioning relief
does not serve as a basis for affirming the Ninth Circuit in this case. To be sure,
district courts properly acting as courts of equity have discretion unless a statute
clearly provides otherwise. But the mere fact that the District Court had discretion
does not suggest that the court, when evaluating the motion, could consider any
and all factors that might relate to the public interest or the parties' conveniences,
including medical needs. Equity courts cannot ignore Congress' judgment expressed
in legislation. Their choice is whether a particular means of enforcement should
be chosen over another permissible means, not whether enforcement is preferable
to no enforcement at all. To the extent a district court considers the public interest
and parties' conveniences, the court is limited to evaluating how those factors
are affected by the selection of an injunction over other enforcement mechanisms.
Because the Controlled Substances Act covers even those who have what could be termed
a medical necessity, it precludes consideration of the evidence that the Ninth Circuit
deemed relevant. Pp. 11-15.
190 F.3d 1109, reversed and remanded.
COUNSEL: Barbara D. Underwood argued the cause for petitioner.
Gerald F. Uelmen argued the cause for respondents.
JUDGES: THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.
BREYER, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
OPINION BY: THOMAS
OPINION
[*486] JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., prohibits
the manufacture and distribution of various drugs, including marijuana. In this
case, we must decide whether there is a medical necessity exception to these prohibitions.
We hold that there is not.
I
In November 1996, California voters enacted an initiative measure entitled the Compassionate
Use Act of 1996. Attempting "to ensure that seriously ill Californians have
the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes," Cal. Health &
Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2001), the statute creates an exception to
California laws prohibiting the possession and cultivation of marijuana. These prohibitions
no longer apply to a patient or his primary caregiver who possesses or cultivates
marijuana for the patient's medical purposes upon the recommendation or approval
of a physician. Ibid. In the wake of this voter initiative, several groups organized
"medical cannabis dispensaries" to meet the needs of qualified patients.
United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (ND Cal. 1998).
Respondent Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative is one of these groups.
The Cooperative is a not-for-profit organization that operates in downtown Oakland.
A physician serves as medical director, and registered nurses staff the Cooperative
during business hours. To become a member, a patient must provide a written statement
from a treating physician assenting to marijuana therapy and must submit to a screening
interview. If accepted as a member, the patient receives an identification card
entitling him to obtain marijuana from the Cooperative.
In January 1998, the United States sued the Cooperative and its executive director,
respondent Jeffrey Jones (together, [*487] the Cooperative), in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Seeking
to enjoin the Cooperative from distributing and manufacturing marijuana, [Footnote
1] the United States argued that, whether or not the Cooperative's activities are
legal under California law, they violate federal law. Specifically, the Government
argued that the Cooperative violated the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions
on distributing, manufacturing, and possessing with the intent to distribute or
manufacture a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Concluding that the Government
had established a probability of success on the merits, the District Court granted
a preliminary injunction. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a-40a, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
The Cooperative did not appeal the injunction but instead openly violated it by
distributing marijuana to numerous persons, App. to Pet. for Cert. at 21a-23a. To
terminate these violations, the Government initiated contempt proceedings. In defense,
the Cooperative contended that any distributions were medically necessary. Marijuana
is the only drug, according to the Cooperative, that can alleviate the severe pain
and other debilitating symptoms of the Cooperative's patients. Id. at 29a. The District
Court rejected this defense, however, after determining there was insufficient evidence
that each recipient of marijuana was in actual danger of imminent harm without the
drug. Id. at 29a-32a. The District Court found the Cooperative in contempt and,
at the Government's request, modified the preliminary injunction to empower the
United States Marshal to seize the Cooperative's premises. Id. at 37a. Although
recognizing that [*488] "human suffering" could result,
the District Court reasoned that a court's "equitable powers [do] not permit
it to ignore federal law." Ibid. Three days later, the District Court summarily
rejected a motion by the Cooperative to modify the injunction to permit distributions
that are medically necessary.
The Cooperative appealed both the contempt order and the denial of the Cooperative's
motion to modify. Before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided the
case, however, the Cooperative voluntarily purged its contempt by promising the
District Court that it would comply with the initial preliminary injunction. Consequently,
the Court of Appeals determined that the appeal of the contempt order was moot.
190 F.3d 1109, 1112-1113 (1999).
The denial of the Cooperative's motion to modify the injunction, however, presented
a live controversy that was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Reaching the
merits of this issue, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. According to the
Court of Appeals, the medical necessity defense was a "legally cognizable defense"
that likely would apply in the circumstances. 190 F.3d at 1114. Moreover, the Court
of Appeals reasoned, the District Court erroneously "believed that it had no
discretion to issue an injunction that was more limited in scope than the Controlled
Substances Act itself." Id. at 1114-1115. Because, according to the Court of
Appeals, district courts retain "broad equitable discretion" to fashion
injunctive relief, the District Court could have, and should have, weighed the "public
interest" and considered factors such as the serious harm in depriving patients
of marijuana. Ibid. Remanding the case, the Court of Appeals instructed the District
Court to consider "the criteria for a medical necessity exemption, and, should
it modify the injunction, to set forth those criteria in the modification order."
Id. at 1115. Following these instructions, the District Court granted the Cooperative's
[*489] motion to modify the injunction to incorporate a medical
necessity defense. [Footnote 2]
The United States appealed the District Court's order amending the preliminary injunction.
At the Government's request, we stayed the order pending the appeal. 530 U.S. 1298
(2000). The Court of Appeals has postponed oral argument pending our decision in
this case.
The United States petitioned for certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision
that medical necessity is a legally cognizable defense to violations of the Controlled
Substances Act. Because the decision raises significant questions as to the ability
of the United States to enforce the Nation's drug laws, we granted certiorari. 531
U.S. 1010 (2000).
II
The Controlled Substances Act provides that, "except as authorized by this
subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . .
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The
subchapter, in turn, establishes exceptions. [*490] For marijuana
(and other drugs that have been classified as "schedule I" controlled
substances), there is but one express exception, and it is available only for Government-approved
research projects, § 823(f). Not conducting such a project, the Cooperative cannot,
and indeed does not, claim this statutory exemption.
The Cooperative contends, however, that notwithstanding the apparently absolute
language of § 841(a), the statute is subject to additional, implied exceptions,
one of which is medical necessity. According to the Cooperative, because necessity
was a defense at common law, medical necessity should be read into the Controlled
Substances Act. We disagree.
As an initial matter, we note that it is an open question whether federal courts
ever have authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by statute. A
necessity defense "traditionally covered the situation where physical forces
beyond the actor's control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils."
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410, 62 L. Ed. 2d 575, 100 S. Ct. 624 (1980).
Even at common law, the defense of necessity was somewhat controversial. See, e.g.,
Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 QB 273 (1884). And under our constitutional system,
in which federal crimes are defined by statute rather than by common law, see United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 7 Cranch 32, 34, 3 L. Ed. 259 (1812), it is especially
so. As we have stated: "Whether, as a policy matter, an exemption should be
created is a question for legislative judgment, not judicial inference." United States
v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 559, 61 L. Ed. 2d 68, 99 S. Ct. 2470 (1979).
Nonetheless, we recognize that this Court has discussed the possibility of a necessity
defense without altogether rejecting it. See, e.g., Bailey, supra, at 415. [Footnote
3]
[*491]
We need not decide, however, whether necessity can ever be a defense when the federal
statute does not expressly provide for it. In this case, to resolve the question
presented, we need only recognize that a medical necessity exception for marijuana
is at odds with the terms of the Controlled Substances Act. The statute, to be sure,
does not explicitly abrogate the defense. [Footnote 4] But its provisions leave
no doubt that the defense is unavailable.
Under any conception of legal necessity, one principle is clear: The defense cannot
succeed when the legislature itself has made a "determination of values."
1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.4, p. 629 (1986). In the
case of the Controlled Substances Act, the statute reflects a determination that
marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception (outside the confines of
a Government-approved research project). Whereas some other drugs can be dispensed
and prescribed for medical use, see 21 U.S.C. § 829, the same is not true for marijuana.
Indeed, for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act, marijuana has "no currently
accepted medical use" at all. § 811.
The structure of the Act supports this conclusion. The statute divides drugs into
five schedules, depending in part on whether the particular drug has a currently
accepted [*492] medical use. The Act then imposes restrictions
on the manufacture and distribution of the substance according to the schedule in
which it has been placed. Schedule I is the most restrictive schedule. [Footnote
5] The Attorney General can include a drug in schedule I only if the drug "has
no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," "has
a high potential for abuse," and has "a lack of accepted safety for use
. . . under medical supervision." §§ 812(b)(1)(A)-(C). Under the statute, the
Attorney General could not put marijuana into schedule I if marijuana had any accepted
medical use.
The Cooperative points out, however, that the Attorney General did not place marijuana
into schedule I. Congress put it there, and Congress was not required to find that
a drug lacks an accepted medical use before including the drug in schedule I. We
are not persuaded that this distinction has any significance to our inquiry. Under
the Cooperative's logic, drugs that Congress places in schedule I could be distributed
when medically necessary whereas drugs that the Attorney General places in schedule
I could not. Nothing in the statute, however, suggests that there are two tiers
of schedule I narcotics, with drugs in one tier more readily available than drugs
in the other. On the contrary, the statute consistently treats all schedule I drugs
alike. See, e.g., § 823(a) (providing criteria for Attorney General to consider
when determining whether to register an applicant to manufacture schedule I controlled
substances), § 823(b) (providing criteria for Attorney General to consider when
determining whether to register an applicant to distribute schedule I controlled
substances), § 823(f) (providing procedures for becoming a government-approved research
project), § 826 (establishing production quotas for schedule I drugs). Moreover,
[*493] the Cooperative offers no convincing explanation for why
drugs that Congress placed on schedule I should be subject to fewer controls than
the drugs that the Attorney General placed on the schedule. Indeed, the Cooperative
argues that, in placing marijuana and other drugs on schedule I, Congress "wished
to assert the most restrictive level of controls created by the [Controlled Substances
Act]." Brief for Respondents 24. If marijuana should be subject to the most
restrictive level of controls, it should not be treated any less restrictively than
other schedule I drugs.
The Cooperative further argues that use of schedule I drugs generally -- whether
placed in schedule I by Congress or the Attorney General -- can be medically necessary,
notwithstanding that they have "no currently accepted medical use." According
to the Cooperative, a drug may not yet have achieved general acceptance as a medical
treatment but may nonetheless have medical benefits to a particular patient or class
of patients. We decline to parse the statute in this manner. It is clear from the
text of the Act that Congress has made a determination that marijuana has no medical
benefits worthy of an exception. The statute expressly contemplates that many drugs
"have a useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to maintain
the health and general welfare of the American people," § 801(1), but it includes
no exception at all for any medical use of marijuana. Unwilling to view this omission
as an accident, and unable in any event to override a legislative determination
manifest in a statute, we reject the Cooperative's argument. [Footnote 6]
[*494] Finally, the Cooperative contends that we should construe
the Controlled Substances Act to include a medical necessity defense in order to
avoid what it considers to be difficult constitutional questions. In particular,
the Cooperative asserts that, shorn of a medical necessity defense, the statute
exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause powers, violates the substantive due process rights
of patients, and offends the fundamental liberties of the people under the Fifth,
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. As the Cooperative acknowledges, however, the canon
of constitutional avoidance has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity.
Because we have no doubt that the Controlled Substances Act cannot bear a medical
necessity defense to distributions of marijuana, we do not find guidance in this
avoidance principle. Nor do we consider the underlying constitutional issues today.
Because the Court of Appeals did not address these claims, we decline to do so in
the first instance.
For these reasons, we hold that medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing
and distributing marijuana. [Footnote 7] The [*495] Court of Appeals
erred when it held that medical necessity is a "legally cognizable defense."
190 F.3d at 1114. It further erred when it instructed the District Court on remand
to consider "the criteria for a medical necessity exemption, and, should it
modify the injunction, to set forth those criteria in the modification order."
Id. at 1115.
Finally, we share JUSTICE STEVENS' concern for "showing respect for the sovereign
States that comprise our Federal Union." Post, at 3 (opinion concurring in
judgment). However, we are "construing an Act of Congress, not drafting it."
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415, n. 11, 62 L. Ed. 2d 575, 100 S. Ct.
624 (1980). Because federal courts interpret, rather than author, the federal criminal
code, we are not at liberty to rewrite it. Nor are we passing today on a constitutional
question, such as whether the Controlled Substances Act exceeds Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause.
III
The Cooperative contends that, even if the Controlled Substances Act forecloses
the medical necessity defense, there is an alternative ground for affirming the
Court of Appeals. This case, the Cooperative reminds us, arises from a motion to
modify an injunction to permit distributions that are medically necessary. According
to the Cooperative, the Court of Appeals was correct that the District Court had
"broad equitable discretion" to tailor the injunctive relief to account
for medical necessity, irrespective of whether there is a legal defense of necessity
in the statute. Id. at 1114. To sustain the judgment below, the argument goes, we
need only reaffirm that federal courts, in the exercise of their equity jurisdiction,
have discretion to modify an injunction based upon a weighing of the public interest.
[Footnote 8]
We disagree. Although district courts whose equity powers have been properly invoked
indeed have discretion in fashioning injunctive relief (in the absence of a statutory
restriction), the Court of Appeals erred concerning the factors that the district
courts may consider in exercising such discretion.
[*496] A
As an initial matter, the Cooperative is correct that, when district courts are
properly acting as courts of equity, they have discretion unless a statute clearly
provides otherwise. For "several hundred years," courts of equity have
enjoyed "sound discretion" to consider the "necessities of the public
interest" when fashioning injunctive relief. Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S.
321, 329-330, 88 L. Ed. 754, 64 S. Ct. 587 (1944). See also id. at 329 ("The
essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity
and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility
rather than rigidity has distinguished it"); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305, 312, 72 L. Ed. 2d 91, 102 S. Ct. 1798 (1982) ("In exercising
their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction"). Such discretion
is displaced only by a "clear and valid legislative command." Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398, 90 L. Ed. 1332, 66 S. Ct. 1086 (1946). See
also Romero-Barcelo, supra, at 313 ("Of course, Congress may intervene and
guide or control the exercise of the courts' discretion, but we do not lightly assume
that Congress has intended to depart from established principles").
The Cooperative is also correct that the District Court in this case had discretion.
The Controlled Substances Act vests district courts with jurisdiction to enjoin
violations of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 882(a). But a "grant of jurisdiction to
issue [equitable relief] hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and
all circumstances," Hecht, supra, at 329 (emphasis omitted). Because the District
Court's use of equitable power is not textually required by any "clear and
valid legislative command," the court did not have to issue an injunction.
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 57 L. Ed. 2d 117, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978), does not support
the Government's contention that the District Court lacked discretion in fashioning
injunctive relief. In Hill, the Court held that the Endangered Species Act of 1973
required the [*497] District Court to enjoin completion of a dam,
whose operation would either eradicate the known population of the snail darter
or destroy its critical habitat. Id. at 193-195. The District Court lacked discretion
because an injunction was the "only means of ensuring compliance."
Romero-Barcelo,
supra, at 314 (explaining why the District Court in Hill
lacked discretion). Congress'"order
of priorities," as expressed in the statute, would be deprived of effect if
the District Court could choose to deny injunctive relief. Hill, supra, at 194.
In effect, the District Court had only a Hobson's choice. By contrast, with respect
to the Controlled Substances Act, criminal enforcement is an alternative, and indeed
the customary, means of ensuring compliance with the statute. Congress' resolution
of the policy issues can be (and usually is) upheld without an injunction.
B
But the mere fact that the District Court had discretion does not suggest that the
District Court, when evaluating the motion to modify the injunction, could consider
any and all factors that might relate to the public interest or the conveniences
of the parties, including the medical needs of the Cooperative's patients. On the
contrary, a court sitting in equity cannot "ignore the judgment of Congress,
deliberately expressed in legislation." Virginian R. Co. v. Railway Employees,
300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937). A district court cannot, for example, override Congress'
policy choice, articulated in a statute, as to what behavior should be prohibited.
" Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of
priorities in a given area, it is . . . for the courts to enforce them when enforcement
is sought." Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194. Courts of equity cannot, in their discretion,
reject the balance that Congress has struck in a statute. Id.
at 194-195. Their
choice (unless there is statutory language to the contrary) is simply whether a
particular means of enforcing the statute should be chosen over another permissible
[*498] means; their choice is not whether enforcement is preferable
to no enforcement at all. [Footnote 9] Consequently, when a court of equity exercises
its discretion, it may not consider the advantages and disadvantages of nonenforcement
of the statute, but only the advantages and disadvantages of "employing the
extraordinary remedy of injunction," Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 311, over
the other available methods of enforcement. Cf. id. at 316 (referring to "discretion
to rely on remedies other than an immediate prohibitory injunction") To the
extent the district court considers the public interest and the conveniences of
the parties, the court is limited to evaluating how such interest and conveniences
are affected by the selection of an injunction over other enforcement mechanisms.
C
In this case, the Court of Appeals erred by considering relevant the evidence that
some people have "serious medical conditions for whom the use of cannabis is
necessary in order to treat or alleviate those conditions or their symptoms,"
that these people "will suffer serious harm if they are denied cannabis,"
and that "there is no legal alternative to cannabis [*499]
for the effective treatment of their medical conditions." 190 F.3d at 1115.
As explained above, in the Controlled Substances Act, the balance already has been
struck against a medical necessity exception. Because the statutory prohibitions
cover even those who have what could be termed a medical necessity, the Act precludes
consideration of this evidence. It was thus error for the Court of Appeals to instruct
the District Court on remand to consider "the criteria for a medical necessity
exemption, and, should it modify the injunction, to set forth those criteria in
the modification order." Ibid.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE BREYER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
CONCUR BY: STEVENS
CONCUR
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE GINSBURG join, concurring
in the judgment.
Lest the Court's narrow holding be lost in its broad dicta, let me restate it here:
"We hold that medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and distributing
marijuana." Ante, at 10 (emphasis added). This confined holding is consistent
with our grant of certiorari, which was limited to the question "whether the
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., forecloses a medical necessity
defense to the Act's prohibition against manufacturing and distributing marijuana,
a Schedule I controlled substance." Pet. for Cert. (I) (emphasis added). And,
at least with respect to distribution, this holding is consistent with how the issue
was raised and litigated below. As stated by the District Court, the question before
it was "whether [respondents'] admitted distribution of marijuana for use by
seriously [*500] ill persons upon a physician's recommendation
violates federal law," and if so, whether such distribution "should be
enjoined pursuant to the injunctive relief provisions of the federal Controlled
Substances Act." United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d
1086, 1091 (ND Cal. 1998) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, in the lower courts as well as here, respondents have raised the medical
necessity defense as a justification for distributing marijuana to cooperative members,
and it was in that context that the Ninth Circuit determined that respondents had
"a legally cognizable defense." 190 F.3d 1109, 1114 (1999). The Court
is surely correct to reverse that determination. Congress' classification of marijuana
as a schedule I controlled substance -- that is, one that cannot be distributed
outside of approved research projects, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 823(f), 829 -- makes
it clear that "the Controlled Substances Act cannot bear a medical necessity
defense to distributions of marijuana," ante, at 10 (emphasis added)). [Footnote
1]
Apart from its limited holding, the Court takes two unwarranted and unfortunate
excursions that prevent me from joining its opinion. First, the Court reaches beyond
its holding, and beyond the facts of the case, by suggesting that the defense of
necessity is unavailable for anyone under the [*501] Controlled
Substances Act. Ante, at 6-9, 10, n. 7, 15. Because necessity was raised in this
case as a defense to distribution, the Court need not venture an opinion on whether
the defense is available to anyone other than distributors. Most notably, whether
the defense might be available to a seriously ill patient for whom there is no alternative
means of avoiding starvation or extraordinary suffering is a difficult issue that
is not presented here. [Footnote 2]
Second, the Court gratuitously casts doubt on "whether necessity can ever be
a defense" to any federal statute that does not explicitly provide for it,
calling such a defense into question by a misleading reference to its existence
as an "open question." Ante, at 5, 6. By contrast, our precedent has expressed
no doubt about the viability of the common-law defense, even in the context of federal
criminal statutes that do not provide for it in so many words. See, e.g., United
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415, 62 L. Ed. 2d 575, 100 S. Ct. 624 (1980) ("We
therefore hold that, where a criminal defendant is charged with escape and claims
that he is entitled to an instruction on the theory of duress or necessity, he must
proffer evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon
as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force"); id.
at 415,
n. 11 ("Our principal difference with the dissent, therefore, is not as to
the existence of such a defense but as to the importance of surrender as an element
of it" (emphasis added)). Indeed, the Court's comment on the general availability
of the necessity defense is completely unnecessary because the Government has made
no such suggestion. Cf. Brief for Petitioner 17-18 (narrowly arguing that necessity
defense cannot succeed if legislature has [*502] already "canvassed
the issue" and precluded it for a particular statute (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The Court's opinion on this point is pure dictum.
The overbroad language of the Court's opinion is especially unfortunate given the
importance of showing respect for the sovereign States that comprise our Federal
Union. That respect imposes a duty on federal courts, whenever possible, to avoid
or minimize conflict between federal and state law, particularly in situations in
which the citizens of a State have chosen to "serve as a laboratory" in
the trial of "novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311, 76 L. Ed.
747, 52 S. Ct. 371 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In my view, this is such a
case. [Footnote 3] By passing Proposition 215, California voters have decided that
seriously ill patients and their primary caregivers should be exempt from prosecution
under state laws for cultivating and possessing marijuana if the patient's physician
recommends using the drug for treatment. [Footnote 4] This case does not call upon
the Court to deprive all such patients of the benefit of the necessity defense to
federal prosecution, when the case itself does not involve any such patients.
An additional point deserves emphasis. This case does not require us to rule on
the scope of the District Court's discretion to enjoin, or to refuse to enjoin,
the possession of marijuana or other potential violations of the Controlled
[*503] Substances Act by a seriously ill patient for whom the drug
may be a necessity. Whether it would be an abuse of discretion for the District
Court to refuse to enjoin those sorts of violations, and whether the District Court
may consider the availability of the necessity defense for that sort of violator,
are questions that should be decided on the authority of cases such as Hecht Co.
v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 88 L. Ed. 754, 64 S. Ct. 587 (1944), and Weinberger
v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 72 L. Ed. 2d 91, 102 S. Ct. 1798 (1982), and that
properly should be left "open" by this case.
I join the Court's judgment of reversal because I agree that a distributor of marijuana
does not have a medical necessity defense under the Controlled Substances Act. I
do not, however, join the dicta in the Court's opinion.